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and 
Asheton Carter 
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This article summarizes many of the criminal law deci-
sions decided by the United States Supreme Court during 
the last two terms. 
SEARCH & SEIZURE 
Pretextual Searches 
In Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a "pretex-
tual" traffic stop. A unanimous Court held that the tempo-
rary detention of a motorist upon probable cause that he vi-
olated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped 
f the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objec-
tive. 
While patrolling a "high drug" area, plainclothes police 
observed a truck at a stoplight. It paused longer than nec-
essary, turned abruptly without a signal, and sped off at an 
unreasonable rate of speed. Traffic stops were not part of 
these plainclothes policemen's duties. Upon approaching 
the vehicle to supposedly warn the driver of possible traffic 
violations, they saw bags of crack cocaine in the defen-
dants' hands. 
Whren argued that the Fourth Amendment test in this 
context should be whether a reasonable officer would have 
stopped the car for the purpose of enforcing a traffic viola-
tion. Whren contended that the police otherwise would be 
encouraged to use common traffic violations as a means to 
investigate different crimes. The Court said its precedents 
made clear that ulterior motives do not invalidate police con-
duct that was justified by probable cause. United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Subjective intent does not 
matter. The Court also rejected Whren's theory that police 
conduct should be judged for its reasonableness according 
to local law enforcement practices. This would mean the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment would change "from 
place to place and from time to time:· 
Finally, Whren argued .that a "balancing of interests" 
under the Fourth Amendment would not support inconve-
niencing motorist by stops from plainclothes police in un-
marked cars. He argued that such a practice would incon-
venience, confuse, and provoke anxiety in motorists, while 
only minimally advancing a government interest in traffic 
safety. The Court found this contention unpersuasive. A 
"balancing of interests" inquiry is used only for searches and 
seizures conducted in some extraordinary manner and 
which unusually invaded privacy or physical interests- for 
example, seizures by deadly force, unannounced entries 
into the home, or physical penetrations of the body. Traffic 
stops by plainclothes police do not fit this category. 
Appellate Review 
In Ornelas v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996), the 
Supreme Court held that decisions concerning "reasonable 
suspicion" to stop motorists and "probable cause" for a sub-
sequent vehicle search should be reviewed de novo on ap-
peal. Each inquiry raises two different issues: The first in-
volves a determination of the historical facts that lead up to 
the stop (or search). The second issue involves a mixed 
question of law and fact: whether, from the perspective of 
an objectively reasonable police officer, reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause existed. Allowing appellate courts to 
independently review the second inquiry is consistent with 
earlier decisions of the Court - for example, Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). It also prevents varied 
results stemming from conflicting interpretations of similar 
facts by different trial judges. Moreover, de novo review is 
necessary for appellate courts to clarify and maintain con-
trol over legal issues. Lastly, it should unify precedent and 
provide the police with a defined set of rules. 
The Court, however, also noted that reviewing courts 
should review historical facts only for clear error. Addition-
ally, "due weighf' should be given to the determinations of 
the trial judge. This means taking into account the distinc-
tive traits and events of a locale and the experiences that 
color the perception and judgment of police officers. 
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Knock & Announce Rule 
In Wiison v. Arkansas, 115 S.Ct. 1914 (1995), Justice 
Thomas, for a unanimous Court, wrote that the common law 
rule of "knock and-announce" is part of the Fourth 
Amendment: 
Our own cases have acknowledged that the common 
law principle of announcement is "embedded in Anglo 
American law," but we have never squarely held that 
this principle is an element of the reasonableness in-
quiry under the Fourth Amendment. We now do so. 
Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of 
the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that 
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the 
method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among 
the factors to be considered in assessing the reason-
ableness of a search or seizure. ld. at 1918. 
The Court indicated that exceptions to the rule must be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis. 
School Drug Searches 
In Vernonia School District 47 J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386 
{1995), the Supreme Court upheld random urinanalysis 
drug testing for public high school students who participated 
in athletic programs. Based on prior cases upholding drug 
testing in other contexts, the Court found the drug testing 
scheme at issue reasonable. "Fourth Amendment rights, no 
less than First and Fourteenth Amendment, are different in 
public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry 
cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary respon-
sibility for children." ld. at 2392. See also Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1 989); Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives' Assn, 489 U.S. 602 (1 989). 
Erroneous Radio Reports 
In Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 {1995), the Supreme 
Court decided that the exclusionary rule~s purpose to deter 
illegal police conduct would not be served where an officer 
arrests someone following a radio report of an outstanding 
warrant, when in fact the warrant had been quashed. Since 
the error was made, not by police, but by court employees, 
the Supreme Court held that there was no sound reason to 
apply the exclusionary rule. 
[T]here is no basis for believing that application of the 
exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a 
significant effect on court employees responsible for 
informing the police that a warrant has been quashed. 
Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law en-
forcement team engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime, they have no stake in 
the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. ld. at 
1193. 
SELECTIVE PROSECUTIONS 
Many studies and commentators have suggested the 
possibility that African-Americans are selectively prosecuted 
for drug offenses, most notably for crack cocaine. Defend-
ants seeking to assert a selective prosecution claim will re-
ceive little encouragement from United States v. Armstrong, 
116 S.Ct. 1480 {1996). An en bane Ninth Circuit decided 
that a claim of selective prosecution by African-American 
defendants required that the prosecution either submit to 
discovery requests or drop the charges. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that a defendant who seeks discov-
ery for a claim of selective prosecution based upon race 
must meet a threshold requirement- "a credible showing 
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of different treatment of similarly situated persons." ld. at 
1489. This threshold must establish both a prosecutorial ir 
tent to discriminate and a discriminatory effect. See Oyler 
Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
Armstrong argued that Federal Criminal Rule 16, which 
provides for defense discovery of certain documents, sup-
ported the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court diE 
agreed, ruling that discovery under Rule (a)(1 )(C) is limiteo 
to documents related to the prosecution's case-in-chief. 
JURY TRIAL 
Petty Offoense Exception 
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145 {1968), decided that the right to a jury trial does 
not apply to petty offenses. More recently, the Court in 
Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 {1989), held that 
the best indicator of the seriousness of a crime is the lengtl 
of the legislatively determined prison time for the offense. 1 
maximum s'en~ence longer than six months indicates that 
the legislature considered the crime to be serious. A sen-
tence of six months or less is considered a petty offense, 
unless the legislature has authorized additional statutory 
penalties so severe as to indicate that it considered the of-
fense serious. · 
Lewis v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2163 (1996), involved 
multiple crimes whose aggregate punishment exceeded th1 
six-month !imit~ but vvhen taken individually did not. The de 
fendant was a mail carrier charged with two counts of ob-
structing the mail. Each offense carried a maximum jail tim 
of six months. The magistrate ordered a bench trial, com-
menting that she would not impose a sentence of more tha 
six months imprisonment. 
The Supreme Court held that because the legislature se 
the prison term at six months, it considered the offense 
petty. Adding two offenses together to exceed the six-mont 
limit does not change t)le legislative intent, the guiding prin· 
ciple in the analysis. Because the majority believed that thi 
analysis answered the question, it did not determine 
whether a judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing 
changes the right to a jury trial. 
Mixed Questions of Fact & Law 
In United States v. Gaudin, 115 S.Ct. 2310 (1995), the 
defendant was convicted of making false statements on 
loan applications submitted to the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD). To convict, the prosecutio1 
had to prove that the false statements were material to 
HUD's decisions. The trial court held that such a determine: 
tion was for the court, rather than the jury. The Supreme 
Court reversed, finding Fifth and Sixth Amendment viola-
tions. 
The government conceded that materiality is an element 
of the offense but suggested that the jury's responsibility to 
decide the essential elements of a crime is limited to factua 
components. The Court held that the decisions cited by thE 
government, beginning with Sparf & Hansen v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), stand for the proposition that 
juries have always been required to decide mixed question~ 
of law and fact, not simply facts. Indeed, the jury is 
responsible for the "delicate assessments of the inferences 
a 'reasonable [decisionmaker]' would draw from a given set 
of facts and the significance of the inferences to him:' TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1 976). 
INTOXICATION DEFENSE 
In Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. 2013 (1996), the 
Supreme Court ruled that a state statute that precluded an 
accused's use of intoxication to negate a required mens rea 
,..~. did not violate due process. There was, however, no majori-
1 £. ty opinion. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia, 
noted that the primary due process guide "in determining 
whether the principle in question is fundamental is, of 
course, historical practice: The common law did not initially 
recognize intoxication as a defense. Hall, Intoxication and 
Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv L Rev 1045 (1944). "Even-
tually, however, the new view won out, and by the end of the 
19th century, in most American jurisdictions, intoxication 
could be considered in determining whether a defendant 
was capable of forming the specific intent necessary to 
commit the crime charged.' The plurality considered this de-
layed acceptance of the intoxication defense as evidence 
that the defense was not fundamental to our jurisprudence. 
In addition, one-fifth of the states either have never accept-
ed the "new rule" or have recently abandoned it. Moreover, 
the plurality believed there was a justification for abolishing 
the defense. "A large number of crimes, especially violent 
crimes, are committed by intoxicated offenders; modern 
studies put the numbers as high as half of all homicides, for 
example." 
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion provided the criti-
cal fifth vote. She did not view the case as a burden of 
proof or evidentiary case. She concluded that the statute 
redefined the mens rea requirement, a substantive criminal 
issue that had traditionally been left to the states. The dis-
senters disagreed only to the extent that Justice Ginsburg's 
reading of the statute was precluded by the interpretation of 
I the Washington Supreme Court. In the dissenter's view, 
once a state defined a crime to include a mens rea element, 
the state could not prevent the defendant, without a sub-
stantial justification, from introducing evidence to negate 
that element. Even under this view, a state is not precluded 
from defining a crime in such a way that it abolished intoxi-
cation as a defense. 
DUE PROCESS & MENS REA 
The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation 
Act of 1977, 18 U.S. C.§ 2252(a), forbids knowingly trans-
porting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing vi-
sual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct. In United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S.Ct. 464 
(1994), the issue turned on whether the word "knowingly'' 
modified other parts of the statute and not merely the sur-
rounding verbs. The Ninth Circuit held that the statute did 
not require that a defendant know that a performer was a 
minor and ruled the statute unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court reversed. The majority concluded 
that a scienter element is properly read into the statute, so 
that knowledge of a performer's minority is required for 
conviction. In the Court's view, to hold otherwise would 
entail ridiculous results unintended by Congress. If the 
statute had no knowledge requirement for minority status of 
the actors, then "a retail druggist who returns an uninspect-
ed roll of developed film to a customer 'knowingly distrib-
/ utes' a visual depiction and would be criminally liable if it 
were later discovered that the visual depiction contained 
images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct." ld. 
at 467. 
Significantly, the Court believed it necessary to "read the 
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statute to eliminate" any constitutional doubt "so long as 
such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress." ld. at 472. Lack of a scienter requirement for 
the age of the performers would have raised constitutional 
doubts. The Court's interpretation is supported by the tradi-
tion that a statute is to be construed where possible to avoid 
substantial constitutional questions. Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and Staples v. United States, 
114 S.Ct.1793 (1994), had held that"the presumption in 
favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the 
statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent 
conduct:' 115 Ct. at 469. 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 
Due process requires that a defendant be mentally com-
petent during trial. The test is whether the accused has the 
mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings 
and to assist counsel. Forty-six states require an accused 
to satisfy a preponderance-of-evidence standard when as-
serting a lack of mental competence to stand trial. In 
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (1996), the state ar-
gued that its clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, a 
higher standard of proof, did not violate the Due Process 
Clause. The Supreme Court rejected this argument be-
cause it would permit a defendant who is "more likely than 
not" incompetent to stand trial. 
The Court declined to accept Oklahoma's argument that 
such a standard of proof vvas necessaiy to insure prornpt 
and orderly disposition of meritless cases. According to the 
Court, the defendant's right to a fair trial is more important 
than the state's interest in efficient operation of its criminal 
justice system. The Court was able to reconcile this deci-
sion with its opinion in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
(1979), which held that due process requires a clear and 
convincing standard of proof in an involuntary civil commit-
ment proceeding. Such proceedings, according to the 
Court, address entirely different substantive issues. In that 
case, the individual's fundamental right to liberty is protect-
ed. Here, due process protects the fundamental right not to 
stand trial while incompetent. Additionally, Addington did 
not purport to set standards for criminal proceedings. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Forfeiture 
In United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996), the de-
fendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents 
the government from punishing a defendant for a criminal 
offense and then forfeiting his property for that same offense 
in a separate proceeding. In this case, the government 
began forfeiture proceedings against property used to pro-
duce marijuana and then began a criminal prosecution. A 
companion case, consolidated by the Court, involved a for-
feiture proceeding for property used in money laundering 
and proceeds from a felonious drug transaction. The forfei-
ture proceeding was deferred, while the defendants were 
prosecuted for money laundering and drug charges. 
The Supreme Court decided that in rem civil forfeitures 
are neither punishment nor criminal for double jeopardy pur-
poses. The lower courts had relied mainly on United States 
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), and Austin v. United States, 
509 U.S. 602 (1993). According to the majority, the lower 
courts misinterpreted these cases, which did not replace the 
traditional analysis for determining whether a civil sanction 
constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The 
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proper analysis includes a two-part test that asks, first, 
whether Congress intended a particular forfeiture to be a re-
medial civil sanction or a criminal penalty. The second part 
asks whether the forfeiture proceedings are so punitive in 
nature that they cannot legitimately be categorized as civil 
proceedings, despite a congressional intent to establish a 
civil remedy. This two-part test is long established and most 
recently upheld in United States v. One Assortment of 89 
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1 984). 
These precedents establish that "[i]n rem civil forfeiture is 
a remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in 
personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not consti-
tute a punishment for double jeopardy purposes." 116 S.Ct. 
at 2137. In the Court's view, there is no doubt that Con-
gress intended this type of ·proceeding to be civil in nature. 
The statute's enforcement mechanisms are civil, and there 
is insufficient evidence (must be the "clearest proof") 
suggesting that the statutes were so punitive as to render 
them criminal despite a contrary congressional intent. The 
Court found other reasons to support its position: (1) in rem 
civil forfeitures have not historically been regarded as pun-
ishment; (2) there is no requirement in the statutes that the 
government demonstrate scienter to establish that the 
property is forfeitable; (3) although the statutes may have a 
deterrent purpose, this purpose may serve civil as well as 
criminal goals; and (4) the fact that the statutes are tied to 
criminal activity is insufficient in itself to render them 
punitive. 
Double Punishment 
In Witte v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2199 (1 995), the 
Supreme Court ruled that use of uncharged cocaine offens-
es for the purpose of imposing a higher sentence (within the 
statutorily authorized range for a related marijuana charge) 
did not preclude the subsequent prosecution of the cocaine 
charges. 
Witte plead guilty to federal marijuana charges, in which 
the sentencing court took into account as "relevant conduct" 
under the sentencing guidelines the defendant's prior in-
volvement in an uncharged cocaine conspiracy. Witte was 
later indicted on the cocaine charges and moved for dis-
missal, arguing that he was being punished twice for the 
same offense. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, rul-
ing that Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), had 
held that use of relevant conduct to increase punishment for 
a charged offense does not "punish" the offender for the rel-
evant conduct. 
The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that "petitioner's dou-
ble jeopardy theory- that consideration of uncharged con-
duct in arriving at a sentence within the statutorily autho-
rized punishment range constitutes 'punishment' for that 
conduct - is not support by our precedents, which make 
clear that a defendant in that situation is punished, for dou-
ble jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the de-
fendant is convicted." 116 S.Ct at 2205. The Court held that 
Williams governed, regardless of whether the punishment 
enhancement occurs in the first or second proceeding. 
Double Punishment 
In Rutledge v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1241 (1 996), the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that when two statutory 
provisions proscribe the same offense, it is presumed that 
the legislature did not intend to impose two punishments. 
The test is whether each of the statutory provisions requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not. Further, concurrent 
convictions do not invalidate the presumption against multi-
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pie punishments when a potential collateral consequence, 
e.g., delay of parole eligibility or an increased sentence 
under a recidivist statute for a future offense, exist. 
Rutledge's conviction for conspiring to distribute cocainE 
was a lesser included offense of his conviction for a continr 
ing criminal enterprise. Under Blockburger v. United State: 
284 U.S. 299 {1 932), there are two offenses if each statute 
requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The goverr 
ment contended that even if the conspiracy was a lesser i~ 
eluded offense, the presumption against multiple punish-
ments was not violated because the concurrent sentence 
did not amount to punishment at all. The Court rejected th 
argument under Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 {1 985), 
which held that "the collateral consequences of a second 
conviction make it as presumptively impermissible to im-
pose as it would be to impose any other unauthorized cu-
mulative sentence." 116 S.Ct. at 1248. The imposition of a 
fifty dollar assessment for the second conviction was a sufi 
cient collateral consequence. 
BRADY RULE 
In Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555 {1 995), the Supreme 
Court reversed a first degree murder conviction due to a 
Brady violation. While the victim loaded grocery bags into 
her car, a gunman shot her and took the car. The police ot 
tained statements from six eyewitnesses. These witnesse~ 
differed significantly in their descriptions of the height, age, 
weiaht, and hair lenath of the assailant. An informant sub-
sequently contacted-the police, revealing that he might hav 
bought the victim's car from Kyles. The informant expressE 
concern that he would be a suspect, and several of his 
statements were inconsistent. The police found the murde1 
weapon in Kyles's apartment and the victim's purse in the 
apartment complex's garbage, both where the informant 
said they would be. Neither the victim's nor Kyles's finger-
prints were found on the purse or the car, and the police 
never checked for the informant's fingerprints. In a photo-
graphic lineup, three of the six eyewitnesses picked out 
Kyles, two were not sure, and one was not shown the pho-
tographs. 
When the defense requested all exculpatory evidence, 
the prosecution replied that there was none. The defense 
was never informed of the six contemporaneous eyewitnes 
statements, several of the informant's tape and recorded 
statements, license numbers of cars near the scene (none 
of which matched Kyles's car license), an internal police 
memorandum indicating that the informant had suggested 
that the police check the rubbish for the purse, and evi-
dence linking the informant to other crimes at the same 
store and to an earlier murder. The prosecution's case de-
pended on the identifications of four of the eyewitnesses. 
The defense offered an alibi and asserted that the informar 
had "framed" Kyles. The jury deadlocked and a mistrial wa: 
declared. After the mistrial, the prosecutor interviewed the 
informant and additional material inconsistencies devel-
oped. At the retrial, the prosecution once again offered eye 
witnesses and photographs of the scene that they argued 
showed Kyles's car. Several defense witnesses testified thi 
the informant, not Kyles, had been in the stolen car after th' 
murder and that the informant had been near the location i1 
Kyles's apartment where the weapon was subsequently 
found by the police. Kyles was convicted and sentenced to 
death. 
On review, the Supreme Court addressed the Brady 
issue. In United States v Bagley, 473 US 667 (1 985), ''the 
Court disavowed any difference between exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence for Brady purposes, and it aban-
doned the distinction between the second and third AgUrs 
circumstances, i.e., the 'specific-request' and 'general- or 
1
r£ no-request' situations." l.d. at 15?5. ~he Court al~o com- . 
· mented: 'The prosecution's aff1rmat1ve duty to d1sclose evi-
dence favorable to a defendant can trace its origins to early 
20th-century strictures against misrepresentation and is of 
course most prominently associated with this Court's deci-
sion in Brady . ... " ld. at 1565. 
The Court went on to explain that Bagley had addressed 
four aspects of the "materiality" requirement. First, that 
requirement did not mean that the defendant had to show 
that the undisclosed evidence would have resulted in an 
acquittal. 
"Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a 'reasonable 
probability' of a different result, and the adjective is im-
portant. The question is not whether the defendant 
would more likely than not have received a different 
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence 
he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting 
in a verdict worthy of confidence. A 'reasonable prob-
ability' of a different result is accordingly shown when 
the Government's evidentiary suppression 'under-
mines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' ld. at 
1566 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). 
Second, the Bagley materiality requirement is "not a suffi-
ciency of evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate 
that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the 
undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough 
left to convict." Third, once a reviewing court has found con-
f stitutional error ''there is no need for further harmless-error 
review." ld. at 1566. Fourth, the materiality standard focuses 
on the "suppressed evidence considered collectively, not 
item-by-item." ld. at 1567. 
"On the one side, showing that the prosecution knew of 
an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does 
not amount to a Brady violation, without more. But the pros-
ecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be 
assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely 
net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when 
the point of 'reasonable probability' is reached. This in turn 
means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of 
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case, including the police:' ld. at 
1567. If in doubt, the prosecutor should disclose: 'This 
means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking 
too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evi-
dence .... This is as it should be." ld. at 1568. See Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (the prosecutor's in-
terest "in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done"). 
In Kyles, the suppressed evidence "collectively" would 
have made a different result probable. The prosecution's 
eyewitness case would have been substantially weakened if 
the witnesses' prior statements had been revealed. One 
witness's crime scene description differed markedly from 
Kyles's height and weight; it was much closer to the infer-
/ mant's size. A second witness's statement would have "fu-
eled a withering cross-examination, destroying confidence 
in Smallwood's story and raising a substantial implication 
that the prosecutor had coached him to give it." ld. at 1570. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that these 
were the State's two best witnesses. In addition, the infer-
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mant's inconsistent statements would have "revealed a re-
markably uncritical attitude on the part of the police:' ld. at 
1571. 
Polygraph Results 
In Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S.Ct. 7 (i 995), the Su-
preme Court ruled that a lower court was wrong in conclud-
ing that the prosecution's failure to turn over the results of 
polygraph examinations of key witnesses violated Brady. 
The defendant admitted participation in a robbery, in which 
a person was shot and killed. The issue was whether the 
killing was premeditated murder or a lesser form of murder. 
The defendant claimed that the weapon fired accidently. 
Two prosecution witnesses, the defendant's brother and the 
brother's girlfriend, took polygraph examinations prior to 
trial. Their answers were consistent with their subsequent 
trial testimony. When asked about their own involvement in 
the robbery, the examiner found her answers to be "incon-
clusive" and the brother's to be "deceptive." Neither exami-
nation was disclosed to the defense. 
The Court ruled that Brady had not been violated. Poly-
graph results were inadmissible under state law, even for 
impeachment, in the absence of a stipulation. "Disclosure 
of the polygraph results, then, could have had no direct ef-
fect on the outcome of trial, because respondent could have 
made no mention of them either during argument or while 
questioning witnesses." I d. at 1 0. The possibility that the 
undisclosed information would have led the defense counsel 
to additional avenues of discovery was, in the Court's view, 
speculative. Moreover, at the habeas proceeding the trial 
defense counsel testified that he had made a strategic deci-
sion to limit the cross-examination of the brother. 
Accordingly, "it is not 'reasonably likely' that disclosure of the 
polygraph results - inadmissible under state law- would 
have resulted in a different outcome at trial." ld. at 11. 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
In Purkett v. Elem, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995), the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide whether a race neutral ex-
planation for a peremptory juror strike need be persuasive 
or even plausible. The prosecutor had used his peremptory 
strikes to dismiss two African-American jurors. He did so 
because they had long, unkempt hair with mustaches and 
goatees. "And I don't like the way they looked, with the way 
the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the 
beards look suspicious to me." 115 S.Ct. at 1770. 
The Eighth Circuit ruled that ''the prosecution must at 
least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for be-
lieving that those factors will somehow affect the person'~ 
ability to perform his or her duties as a juror'' when striking a 
juror, who is the same race as the defendant. 25 F.3d at 
683. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower 
court had misconstrued Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986). In Batson, the Court had said that the proponent of 
the strike must give a "clear and reasonably specific expla-
nation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the chal-
lenges." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting Texas Dept. of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981 )) 
The Supreme Court explained that this requirement does 
not mean that the reason has to make sense, only that it 
does not deny equal protection. Batson sets forth a three-
step process. First, the opponent must make out a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination. Then, the burden shifts 
to the proponent of the strike to articulate a race-neutral 
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reason for the strike. Finally, if a race-neutral explanation is 
given, the trial court has to decide if the proponent has 
shown purposeful racial discrimination. According to the 
Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit mistakenly believed that 
the second step required a reason that was persuasive, or 
even plausible. Quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 
352, 360 (1991 ), the Court reiterated that "[u]nless a dis-
criminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, 
the reason offered will be deemed race neutral:' The ulti-
mate burden of persuasion to prove racial discrimination 
never shifts from the opponent of the strike. 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a lengthy 
dissent, pointing out that Batson requires that the second 
step include an explanation that "relate[s] to the particular 
case to be tried." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. This interpretation 
serves to avoid pretextual reasons that disguise racially dis-
criminatory intent. The dissent recharacterized the three-
step process of Batson. "First, a pattern of peremptory chal-
lenges of black jurors may establish a prima facie case of 
discriminatory purpose. Second, the prosecutor may rebut 
that prima face case by tendering a race neutral explanation 
for the strikes. Third, the court must decide whether that ex-
planation is pretextual." Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1772. For the 
dissent, Batson is meaningless unless the proponent of the 
strike rebuts the prima facie showing of discrimination with a 
"race neutral, reasonably specific, and trial related" explana-
tion. ld. at 1774. 
EX POST FACTO 
The Supreme Court in California Dept. of Corrections v. 
Morales, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (1995), decided that a statute that 
changed parole hearing procedures after a defendant's con-
viction (thus arguably increasing the sentence imposed) did 
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The California statute 
in question was amended after Morales' conviction to allow 
parole boards to defer suitability hearings for three years. 
Previously, prisoners were allowed annual hearings. 
Morales argued that such a law makes parole less accessi-
ble, thus making his sentence longer in violation of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause. 
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held that the 
statute did nothing to effect Morales's indeterminate sen-
tence (15 years to life), and it did not alter the "substantive 
formula for securing any reductions to the sentencing 
range:' ld. at 1598. The statutory amendment simply al-
tered the method for fixing a parole release date so that the 
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parole board would not have to hold another hearing in the 
year or two after the initial hearing. The Court emphasizec 
that it has long refused to articulate any particular formula 
for measuring when legislative adjustments are of sufficien 
"moment'' to transgress the Ex Post Facto Clause. This 
case aroused no need for such articulation because the 
amended statute's chance for increasing punishment was 
far too "speculative and attenuated." 
HABEAS CORPUS 
The Supreme Court in Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S.Ct. 
457 (1995), addressed the question of whether state court 
"in custody'' rulings, which determine whether Miranda 
warnings are due, qualify for a presumption of correctness 
under 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d). The Ninth Circuit had affirmed 
denial of a habeas petition on the grounds that the issue 
raised a factual issue. Consequently, the presumption of 
correctness applied. 
The Supreme Court, however, held that determining 
whether a suspect is "in custody'' is a mixed question of lav 
and fact; a question which state trial courts are in no better 
position than federal courts to answer. In prior cases, the 
Court has held that factual issues for section 2254(d) pur-
poses are those which are "basic, primary, or historical 
facts." Miller v. Fenton, 47 4 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). In certai' 
instances, factual issues extend beyond what are consid-
ered the ''what happened" facts. These might include com-
petency to stand trial or juror impartiality - issues judged 
according to witness credibility and demeanor. These is-
sues are more properly resolved by the trial court. In con-
trast, other issues, such as the voluntariness of a confes-
sion or the effectiveness of counsel's assistance, should be 
considered questions of law in this context. 
Under this last line of cases, there are ''what happened" 
issues that warrant the presumption of correctness and 
there are questions on the "ultimate question" which are ou 
side of the statutory presumption. This has to do with the 
"uniquely legal dimension" of the "ultimate question." Miller 
v. Fenton, 47 4 U.S. 104, 116 (1985). For example, in the 
cases such as the one at hand, there is a difference be-
tween the circumstances surrounding the defendant's con-
fession and whether a reasonable person would have felt 
that he or she was not at liberty to end the interrogation an 
leave. The Court held that the determination is one of 
mixed law and fact, placing it outside the statutory presum~ 
tion. 
